Fight Over Vaccine-Autism Link Hits Court

The problem is that vaccines *don't* cause autism.


Because pharma paid science said so?? Did you know mercury
poisoning can cause microcephaly, Children with autism have
macrocephaly. But.... If the mercury causes partial damage to genes
it would result in an overexrpession and this would cause
macrocephaly.




I know you care about children, I never said you didnt.



PS, the word is spelled "****."


Thanks for the spell check, I didnt know that! lol


Donna


On Jun 12, 8:19 am, Jeff wrote:
Kevysmom wrote:
I would be delighted if the cases were all
rejected. That is justice.

Spoken like a true Pharma Shill! Phuck the kids as long as Pharma
prevails! You are sad Mark.

Donna

The problem is that vaccines *don't* cause autism. As sad as I am for
the kids and their families, the vaccine makers had nothing to do with
causing autism.

Jeff

PS, the word is spelled "****."

Kevysmom wrote:
Science is not decided by a judge. It is decided by evidence and data.

What do you think evidence is?? It is scientific proof, not what the
media and pharma paid data use.

Donna

Evidence in science and evidence in a court room are two very different
things. That is why there are science schools and law schools. The
evidence in the courtroom is presented to make a case.

And if you think evidence is proof of anything, you're wrong. In
science, you can support a hypothesis or theory, but you really can't
prove it. You can disprove it, however.

The point is that courts bring closure to legal matters, not scientific
matters.

Science is the least of the concerns in just about any court battles,
including this one.

Jeff

And if you think evidence is proof of anything, you're wrong. In
science, you can support a hypothesis or theory, but you really can't
prove it.


The tobacco companies had many scientific studies proving smoking
doesnt cause cancer, They denied any link until they lost in court.
Like I said REAL science prevails when there is justice. I just hope
the special masters in this case hasnt been bought.

Are you really a pediatrician Jeff?


Donna




On Jun 12, 8:29 am, Jeff wrote:
Kevysmom wrote:
Science is not decided by a judge. It is decided by evidence and data.

What do you think evidence is?? It is scientific proof, not what the
media and pharma paid data use.

Donna

Evidence in science and evidence in a court room are two very different
things. That is why there are science schools and law schools. The
evidence in the courtroom is presented to make a case.

And if you think evidence is proof of anything, you're wrong. In
science, you can support a hypothesis or theory, but you really can't
prove it. You can disprove it, however.

The point is that courts bring closure to legal matters, not scientific
matters.

Science is the least of the concerns in just about any court battles,
including this one.

Jeff

Kevysmom wrote:
And if you think evidence is proof of anything, you're wrong. In
science, you can support a hypothesis or theory, but you really can't
prove it.


The tobacco companies had many scientific studies proving smoking
doesnt cause cancer, They denied any link until they lost in court.

Yet, had the tobacco companies not been in court, we would still believe
that smoking causes cancer.

Like I said REAL science prevails when there is justice.

Wrong. A legal team will prevail.

I just hope
the special masters in this case hasnt been bought.

Actually, the scientists on both sides have been bought.


Are you really a pediatrician Jeff?

I did a couple of years of pediatric residency, but I decided that it
wasn't the career for me.

Donna




On Jun 12, 8:29 am, Jeff wrote:
Kevysmom wrote:
Science is not decided by a judge. It is decided by evidence and data.
What do you think evidence is?? It is scientific proof, not what the
media and pharma paid data use.
Donna
Evidence in science and evidence in a court room are two very different
things. That is why there are science schools and law schools. The
evidence in the courtroom is presented to make a case.

And if you think evidence is proof of anything, you're wrong. In
science, you can support a hypothesis or theory, but you really can't
prove it. You can disprove it, however.

The point is that courts bring closure to legal matters, not scientific
matters.

Science is the least of the concerns in just about any court battles,
including this one.

Jeff

Wrong. A legal team will prevail.

So, who ever has the better attorney wins? Thats not justice. But this
is America.



Actually, the scientists on both sides have been bought.

Yes, I guess I do have to agree.


I did a couple of years of pediatric residency, but I decided that it
wasn't the career for me.


I was hoping you were a pediatrican, I was going to ask what you would
do for the kids when the truth is revealed about how kids became
"sick" with mercury poisoning.

On Jun 12, 9:04 am, Jeff wrote:
Kevysmom wrote:
And if you think evidence is proof of anything, you're wrong. In
science, you can support a hypothesis or theory, but you really can't
prove it.

The tobacco companies had many scientific studies proving smoking
doesnt cause cancer, They denied any link until they lost in court.

Yet, had the tobacco companies not been in court, we would still believe
that smoking causes cancer.

Like I said REAL science prevails when there is justice.

Wrong. A legal team will prevail.

I just hope
the special masters in this case hasnt been bought.

Actually, the scientists on both sides have been bought.

Are you really a pediatrician Jeff?

I did a couple of years of pediatric residency, but I decided that it
wasn't the career for me.



Donna

On Jun 12, 8:29 am, Jeff wrote:
Kevysmom wrote:
Science is not decided by a judge. It is decided by evidence and data.
What do you think evidence is?? It is scientific proof, not what the
media and pharma paid data use.
Donna
Evidence in science and evidence in a court room are two very different
things. That is why there are science schools and law schools. The
evidence in the courtroom is presented to make a case.

And if you think evidence is proof of anything, you're wrong. In
science, you can support a hypothesis or theory, but you really can't
prove it. You can disprove it, however.

The point is that courts bring closure to legal matters, not scientific
matters.

Science is the least of the concerns in just about any court battles,
including this one.

Jeff- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

Kevysmom wrote:

It means they're going to have to use actual science to support their
case. Which is going to be hard.



Im glad its going to court. Now the REAL science will prevail! Not
just pharma "paid" science!

Donna

I'm afraid you're in for a disappointment.

On Jun 12, 6:58 am, JohnDoe wrote:

Kevysmom wrote:

BTW, the special masters have already ruled that they will apply Daubert
standards to evaluate the evidence.

Mark,

What does that mean?

It means they're going to have to use actual science to support their
case. Which is going to be hard.


Would you be happy if these kids never receive justice?

Donna

I'd rather see the kids receive effective treatment and their parents
paying attention to their kids needs in stead of focussing on this
courtcase.

Jeff wrote:

Kevysmom wrote:

It means they're going to have to use actual science to support their
case. Which is going to be hard.



Im glad its going to court. Now the REAL science will prevail! Not
just pharma "paid" science!


If you really think that the court case has everything to do with
science, you're incorrect. The court case has everything to do with
winning the case and little to do with science or finding the truth.

Science is not decided by a judge. It is decided by evidence and data.

Jeff

I figured that is where 'Daubert' comes in.

Donna


On Jun 12, 6:58 am, JohnDoe wrote:

Kevysmom wrote:

BTW, the special masters have already ruled that they will apply
Daubert
standards to evaluate the evidence.

Mark,
What does that mean?

It means they're going to have to use actual science to support their
case. Which is going to be hard.

Would you be happy if these kids never receive justice?
Donna

I'd rather see the kids receive effective treatment and their parents
paying attention to their kids needs in stead of focussing on this
courtcase.

Kevysmom wrote:

The problem is that vaccines *don't* cause autism.



Because pharma paid science said so??

And you of course believe Wakefield - the best research a lawyer's money
can buy.

Did you know mercury poisoning can cause microcephaly,

Well, I'm glad then that vaccines don't cause mercury poisoning.

Children with autism have macrocephaly.

Well, that seems to prove that mercury and autism are not related. After
all, if the kids have the exact opposite condition that mercury causes....

But.... If the mercury causes partial damage to genes
it would result in an overexrpession and this would cause
macrocephaly.

I notice the word 'if'. Does mercury do that? Or do you simply believe
it does because you need to believe it does.

I know you care about children, I never said you didnt.

PS, the word is spelled "****."

Thanks for the spell check, I didnt know that! lol


Donna


On Jun 12, 8:19 am, Jeff wrote:

Kevysmom wrote:

I would be delighted if the cases were all

rejected. That is justice.

Spoken like a true Pharma Shill! Phuck the kids as long as Pharma
prevails! You are sad Mark.

Donna

The problem is that vaccines *don't* cause autism. As sad as I am for
the kids and their families, the vaccine makers had nothing to do with
causing autism.

Jeff

PS, the word is spelled "****."

Kevysmom wrote:

And if you think evidence is proof of anything, you're wrong. In
science, you can support a hypothesis or theory, but you really can't
prove it.



The tobacco companies had many scientific studies proving smoking
doesnt cause cancer, They denied any link until they lost in court.
Like I said REAL science prevails when there is justice. I just hope
the special masters in this case hasnt been bought.

I see you're already setting up an excuse in case the case is lost. If
you win, real science has prevailed, if you lose, the master has been
bought. Whatever the outcome, your belief that vaccines cause autism is
bulletproof. Nice.

Are you really a pediatrician Jeff?


Donna




On Jun 12, 8:29 am, Jeff wrote:

Kevysmom wrote:

Science is not decided by a judge. It is decided by evidence and data.

What do you think evidence is?? It is scientific proof, not what the
media and pharma paid data use.

Donna

Evidence in science and evidence in a court room are two very different
things. That is why there are science schools and law schools. The
evidence in the courtroom is presented to make a case.

And if you think evidence is proof of anything, you're wrong. In
science, you can support a hypothesis or theory, but you really can't
prove it. You can disprove it, however.

The point is that courts bring closure to legal matters, not scientific
matters.

Science is the least of the concerns in just about any court battles,
including this one.

Jeff

fyi:

Rule 702. Testimony by Experts

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.

Notes

Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in
order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that
are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that
their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's
opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.


notes 702

Rule 702 has been amended in response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and to the many cases
applying Daubert, including Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167
(1999). In Daubert the Court charged trial judges with the
responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to exclude unreliable expert
testimony, and the Court in Kumho clarified that this gatekeeper
function applies to all expert testimony, not just testimony based in
science. See also Kumho, 119 S.Ct. at 1178 (citing the Committee Note to
the proposed amendment to Rule 702, which had been released for public
comment before the date of the Kumho decision). The amendment affirms
the trial court's role as gatekeeper and provides some general standards
that the trial court must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness
of proffered expert testimony. Consistently with Kumho, the Rule as
amended provides that all types of expert testimony present questions of
admissibility for the trial court in deciding whether the evidence is
reliable and helpful. Consequently, the admissibility of all expert
testimony is governed by the principles of Rule 104(a). Under that Rule,
the proponent has the burden of establishing that the pertinent
admissibility requirements are met by a preponderance of the evidence.
See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).

Daubert set forth a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in
assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony. The specific
factors explicated by the Daubert Court are (1) whether the expert's
technique or theory can be or has been tested - that is, whether the
expert's theory can be challenged in some objective sense, or whether it
is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot
reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether the technique or
theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the known or
potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; (4) the
existence and maintenance of standards and controls; and (5) whether the
technique or theory has been generally accepted in the scientific
community. The Court in Kumho held that these factors might also be
applicable in assessing the reliability of nonscientific expert
testimony, depending upon ''the particular circumstances of the
particular case at issue.'' 119 S.Ct. at 1175.

No attempt has been made to ''codify'' these specific factors. Daubert
itself emphasized that the factors were neither exclusive nor
dispositive. Other cases have recognized that not all of the specific
Daubert factors can apply to every type of expert testimony. In addition
to Kumho, 119 S.Ct. at 1175, see Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102
F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that the factors mentioned by the Court
in Daubert do not neatly apply to expert testimony from a sociologist).
See also Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 809 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding that lack of peer review or publication was not
dispositive where the expert's opinion was supported by ''widely
accepted scientific knowledge''). The standards set forth in the
amendment are broad enough to require consideration of any or all of the
specific Daubert factors where appropriate.

Courts both before and after Daubert have found other factors relevant
in determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be
considered by the trier of fact. These factors include:

(1) Whether experts are ''proposing to testify about matters growing
naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent
of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions
expressly for purposes of testifying.'' Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).

(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted
premise to an unfounded conclusion. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522
U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (noting that in some cases a trial court ''may
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the
data and the opinion proffered'').

(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative
explanations. See Claar v. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir.
1994) (testimony excluded where the expert failed to consider other
obvious causes for the plaintiff's condition). Compare Ambrosini v.
Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (the possibility of some
uneliminated causes presents a question of weight, so long as the most
obvious causes have been considered and reasonably ruled out by the expert).

(4) Whether the expert ''is being as careful as he would be in his
regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting.''
Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997).
See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999) (Daubert
requires the trial court to assure itself that the expert ''employs in
the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes
the practice of an expert in the relevant field'').

(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to
reach reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would give.
See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1175 (1999) (Daubert's
general acceptance factor does not ''help show that an expert's
testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as,
for example, do theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted
principles of astrology or necromancy.''); Moore v. Ashland Chemical,
Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (clinical doctor was
properly precluded from testifying to the toxicological cause of the
plaintiff's respiratory problem, where the opinion was not sufficiently
grounded in scientific methodology); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.,
855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting testimony based on ''clinical
ecology'' as unfounded and unreliable).

All of these factors remain relevant to the determination of the
reliability of expert testimony under the Rule as amended. Other factors
may also be relevant. See Kumho, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1176 (''(W)e conclude
that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a
particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert
testimony is reliable.''). Yet no single factor is necessarily
dispositive of the reliability of a particular expert's testimony. See,
e.g., Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 1999)
(''not only must each stage of the expert's testimony be reliable, but
each stage must be evaluated practically and flexibly without
bright-line exclusionary (or inclusionary) rules.''); Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317, n.5 (9th Cir. 1995)
(noting that some expert disciplines ''have the courtroom as a principal
theatre of operations'' and as to these disciplines ''the fact that the
expert has developed an expertise principally for purposes of litigation
will obviously not be a substantial consideration.'').

A review of the caselaw after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert
testimony is the exception rather than the rule. Daubert did not work a
''seachange over federal evidence law,'' and ''the trial court's role as
gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary
system.'' United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land Situated in Leflore
County, Mississippi, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir. 1996). As the Court in
Daubert stated: ''Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.'' 509 U.S. at 595. Likewise, this amendment is not intended to
provide an excuse for an automatic challenge to the testimony of every
expert. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999)
(noting that the trial judge has the discretion ''both to avoid
unnecessary 'reliability' proceedings in ordinary cases where the
reliability of an expert's methods is properly taken for granted, and to
require appropriate proceedings in the less usual or more complex cases
where cause for questioning the expert's reliability arises.'').

When a trial court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert's
testimony is reliable, this does not necessarily mean that contradictory
expert testimony is unreliable. The amendment is broad enough to permit
testimony that is the product of competing principles or methods in the
same field of expertise. See, e.g., Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167
F.3d 146, 160 (3d Cir. 1999) (expert testimony cannot be excluded simply
because the expert uses one test rather than another, when both tests
are accepted in the field and both reach reliable results). As the court
stated in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d
Cir. 1994), proponents ''do not have to demonstrate to the judge by a
preponderance of the evidence that the assessments of their experts are
correct, they only have to demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence
that their opinions are reliable. . . . The evidentiary requirement of
reliability is lower than the merits standard of correctness.'' See also
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th
Cir. 1995) (scientific experts might be permitted to testify if they
could show that the methods they used were also employed by ''a
recognized minority of scientists in their field.''); Ruiz-Troche v.
Pepsi Cola, 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998) (''Daubert neither requires
nor empowers trial courts to determine which of several competing
scientific theories has the best provenance.'').

The Court in Daubert declared that the ''focus, of course, must be
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they
generate.'' 509 U.S. at 595. Yet as the Court later recognized,
''conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one
another.'' General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). Under
the amendment, as under Daubert, when an expert purports to apply
principles and methods in accordance with professional standards, and
yet reaches a conclusion that other experts in the field would not
reach, the trial court may fairly suspect that the principles and
methods have not been faithfully applied. See Lust v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 1996). The amendment
specifically provides that the trial court must scrutinize not only the
principles and methods used by the expert, but also whether those
principles and methods have been properly applied to the facts of the
case. As the court noted in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d
717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994), ''any step that renders the analysis unreliable
.. . . renders the expert's testimony inadmissible. This is true whether
the step completely changes a reliable methodology or merely misapplies
that methodology.''

If the expert purports to apply principles and methods to the facts of
the case, it is important that this application be conducted reliably.
Yet it might also be important in some cases for an expert to educate
the factfinder about general principles, without ever attempting to
apply these principles to the specific facts of the case. For example,
experts might instruct the factfinder on the principles of
thermodynamics, or bloodclotting, or on how financial markets respond to
corporate reports, without ever knowing about or trying to tie their
testimony into the facts of the case. The amendment does not alter the
venerable practice of using expert testimony to educate the factfinder
on general principles. For this kind of generalized testimony, Rule 702
simply requires that: (1) the expert be qualified; (2) the testimony
address a subject matter on which the factfinder can be assisted by an
expert; (3) the testimony be reliable; and (4) the testimony ''fit'' the
facts of the case.

As stated earlier, the amendment does not distinguish between scientific
and other forms of expert testimony. The trial court's gatekeeping
function applies to testimony by any expert. See Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1171 (1999) (''We conclude that Daubert's
general holding - setting forth the trial judge's general 'gatekeeping'
obligation - applies not only to testimony based on 'scientific'
knowledge, but also to testimony based on 'technical' and 'other
specialized' knowledge.''). While the relevant factors for determining
reliability will vary from expertise to expertise, the amendment rejects
the premise that an expert's testimony should be treated more
permissively simply because it is outside the realm of science. An
opinion from an expert who is not a scientist should receive the same
degree of scrutiny for reliability as an opinion from an expert who
purports to be a scientist. See Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984,
991 (5th Cir. 1997) (''(I)t seems exactly backwards that experts who
purport to rely on general engineering principles and practical
experience might escape screening by the district court simply by
stating that their conclusions were not reached by any particular method
or technique.''). Some types of expert testimony will be more
objectively verifiable, and subject to the expectations of
falsifiability, peer review, and publication, than others. Some types of
expert testimony will not rely on anything like a scientific method, and
so will have to be evaluated by reference to other standard principles
attendant to the particular area of expertise. The trial judge in all
cases of proffered expert testimony must find that it is properly
grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative before it can be admitted.
The expert's testimony must be grounded in an accepted body of learning
or experience in the expert's field, and the expert must explain how the
conclusion is so grounded. See, e.g., American College of Trial Lawyers,
Standards and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony after Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 579 (1994) (''(W)hether the
testimony concerns economic principles, accounting standards, property
valuation or other non-scientific subjects, it should be evaluated by
reference to the 'knowledge and experience' of that particular field.'').

The amendment requires that the testimony must be the product of
reliable principles and methods that are reliably applied to the facts
of the case. While the terms ''principles'' and ''methods'' may convey a
certain impression when applied to scientific knowledge, they remain
relevant when applied to testimony based on technical or other
specialized knowledge. For example, when a law enforcement agent
testifies regarding the use of code words in a drug transaction, the
principle used by the agent is that participants in such transactions
regularly use code words to conceal the nature of their activities. The
method used by the agent is the application of extensive experience to
analyze the meaning of the conversations. So long as the principles and
methods are reliable and applied reliably to the facts of the case, this
type of testimony should be admitted.

Nothing in this amendment is intended to suggest that experience alone -
or experience in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or
education - may not provide a sufficient foundation for expert
testimony. To the contrary, the text of Rule 702 expressly contemplates
that an expert may be qualified on the basis of experience. In certain
fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole, basis for a great
deal of reliable expert testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Jones,
107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997) (no abuse of discretion in admitting the
testimony of a handwriting examiner who had years of practical
experience and extensive training, and who explained his methodology in
detail); Tassin v. Sears Roebuck, 946 F.Supp. 1241, 1248 (M.D.La. 1996)
(design engineer's testimony can be admissible when the expert's
opinions ''are based on facts, a reasonable investigation, and
traditional technical/mechanical expertise, and he provides a reasonable
link between the information and procedures he uses and the conclusions
he reaches''). See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167,
1178 (1999) (stating that ''no one denies that an expert might draw a
conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive and specialized
experience.'').

If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the
witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion
reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and
how that experience is reliably applied to the facts. The trial court's
gatekeeping function requires more than simply ''taking the expert's
word for it.'' See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d
1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995) (''We've been presented with only the
experts' qualifications, their conclusions and their assurances of
reliability. Under Daubert, that's not enough.''). The more subjective
and controversial the expert's inquiry, the more likely the testimony
should be excluded as unreliable. See O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994) (expert testimony based on a
completely subjective methodology held properly excluded). See also
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1176 (1999) (''(I)t will
at times be useful to ask even of a witness whose expertise is based
purely on experience, say, a perfume tester able to distinguish among
140 odors at a sniff, whether his preparation is of a kind that others
in the field would recognize as acceptable.'').


j.