OB mass child abuse: Missouri Medical Board to stop OBs?

OB MASS CHILD ABUSE: MISSOURI MEDICAL BOARD TO STOP OBs?


In this email, Missouri Medical Bd = Missouri State Board of Regisration for
the Healing Arts

Attn Missouri Medical Bd Investigators (JOHN HEIDY et al., listed below):
See the Four OB Lies below. These Four OB Lies are WHOPPERS. (Copied to
Oregon Attorney General Hardy Myers via )

Women should not have to ASK for the "extra" up to 30% - most women don't
even know OBs are robbing it! See below.

CONVENIENTLY WRITTEN IN ENGLISH...

Judge Wolff recently wrote to English-speaking lawyers for the Missouri
Medical Board:

"Read the statute. [It] is written, conveniently, in English..." (see below)

In the same decision, Judge Wolff wrote (conveniently, in English) of the
Missouri Medical Board:

"The board has the power to move quickly to end practices that it considers
dangerous. Section 334.102."

HOPEFULLY, English-speaking lawyers and MDs over at the Missouri State Board
will want to move quickly to end the OB practice of closing birth canals up
to 30% thereby stopping the OB practice of KEEPING birth canals closed the
"extra" up to 30% when babies get stuck.

OBs are also temporarily asphyxiating babies and robbing them of up to 50%
of their blood volume - ROUTINELY - this is happening to EVERY CESAREAN
BABY, according to retired obstetrician George Malcolm Morley, MB ChB FACOG.

See Umbilical assault (also: Amy: Futue te ipsum et caballum tuum : )
http://health.groups.yahoo.com/group...t/message/3211

I hope robbing people of up to 50% of their blood volume is considered
dangerous in Missouri.

I am in favor of pardons in advance for MDs. As medical students, MDs are
TRAINED to perform child abuse.

PREGNANT WOMEN: By using semisitting and dorsal delivery, OBs are closing
birth canals up to 30% and keeping birth canals closed the "extra" up to 30%
when babies get stuck. It's easy to allow your birth canal to open the
"extra" up to 30% - just roll onto your side as you push your baby out - BUT
BEWARE - some OBs will let women "try" alternative" delivery positions but
will roll them back to semisitting or dorsal (close the birth canal the
"extra" up to 30%) for the actual delivery.

AND REMEMBER: When babies get stuck, it is ROUTINE for OBs to KEEP the
birth canal closed the "extra" up to 30% as they crank on babies' spines
with hands, forceps and vacuums. See OB Lie #4 below.

Sometimes OBs pull so hard they rip spinal nerves out of tiny spinal cords.

Some babies die - some babies get paralyzed - most "only" have their spines
gruesomely wrenched.

ALL spinal manipulation is gruesome with the birth canal closed the "extra"
up to 30%.

FURTHER CRIME: OBs are slicing vaginas and abdomens en masse
(episiotomy/c-section) - surgically/fraudulently inferring they are
doing/have done everything possible to open birth canals - even as they
close birth canals up to 30%.

ATTENTION MISSOURI STATE BOARD/HEALING ARTS

Again, I am in favor of pardons in advance for MDs. As medical students,
MDs are TRAINED to perform child abuse.

John Heidy Chief Investigator 573/751-5946
Bob Gaiser Investigator 816/650-9300
Bryan Hutchings Investigator 417/889-5029
Catherine Stewart Investigator 314/894-2096
Frank Corona Investigator 314/469-4525
J.W. Loftin Investigator 314/830-1286
Michael Bergman Investigator 816/373-5970
Randall Keller Investigator 573/756-2467
Willard Ward Investigator 573/443-5840
William Finnegan Investigator 314/843-4324
William Hobbs, Jr. Investigator 636/861-9863
Linda Leslie Investigator 816/505-9160

Missouri State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts
3605 Missouri Boulevard
P.O. Box 4
Jefferson City, MO 65102
573.751.0098 Telephone

http://pr.mo.gov/healingarts.asp

THE FOUR OB LIES


OB LIE #1. After MASSIVE change in the AP pelvic outlet diameter was
clinically demonstrated in 1911 and radiographically demonstrated in 1957,
the authors of Williams Obstetrics began erroneously claiming that pelvic
diamaters DON'T CHANGE at delivery.


OB LIE #2. After Ohlsen pointed out in 1973 that pelvic diameters DO
change - the authors of Williams Obstetrics began erroneously claiming that
their most frequent delivery position - dorsal - widens the outlet.


OB LIE #3. After I pointed out in 1992 that dorsal CLOSES - and so does
semisitting - the authors of Williams Obstetrics - put the correct
biomechanics in their 1993 edition - but kept in their text (in the same
paragraph!) - the dorsal widens bald lie that first called my attention to
their text...


OB LIE #4. OBs are actually KEEPING birth canals closed when babies get
stuck - and claiming they are doing everything to allow the birth canal open
maximally. (ACOG Shoulder Dystocia video - also forceps and vacuum births
are performed with the mother in lithotomy.)


See Make birth better: Dan Rather, before you leave CBS...
http://health.groups.yahoo.com*/grou...t/message/2983


I noted some of the OB lies in an Open Letter to the FTC years ago...
http://home1.gte.net/gastaldo/*part2ftc.html


RELEVANT AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS....


"[AMA physician[s] shall...strive to expose those physicians...who engage in
fraud or deception."


"[AMA p]hysician[s] shall...seek changes in those requirements which are
contrary to the best interests of the patient."


"[AMA p]hysician[s] shall...make relevant information available to patients,
colleagues, and the public..."
http://www.psych.org/psych_pra*ct/et...ions53101*.cfm


OTHER PHYSICIAN FRAUD AND DECEPTION

Physicians are concealing a vaccine adverse event (failure-to-immunize) as
they fraudulently promote their vaccinations as being 100% effective as they
(in effect) deny massive numbers of babies massive numbers of free daily
immunizations.

See Breasts as doctors (also: Medical Veritas)
http://health.groups.yahoo.com/group...t/message/3284

Physicians are also temporarily asphyxiating babies and robbing massive
amounts of blood volume from them (up to 50%). The medical euphemism for
this obvious medical crime is "immediate cord clamping."

Umbilical assault (also: Amy: Futue te ipsum et caballum tuum : )
http://health.groups.yahoo.com/group...t/message/3211

Again, Judge Wolff wrote of the Missouri State Board of Registration for the
Healing Arts:

"The board has the power to move quickly to end practices that it considers
dangerous. Section 334.102."

Hopefully the board thinks it is dangerous for OBs to close birth canals up
to 30% and keep birth canals closed when babies get stuck.

Hopefully the board thinks it is dangerous for OBs to temporarily asphyxiate
babies and rob them of up to 50% of their blood volume...

"The board has the power to move quickly to end practices that it considers
dangerous. Section 334.102."

JUDGE WOLFF ON CARDIAC BYPASS vs. CHELATION

My thanks to Consumer Advocate Tim Bolen who called my attention to Judge
Wolff in Quackbusters "Horse-Whipped" by Missouri Supreme Court, Wednesday,
March 23rd, 2005

Chelation MAY OR MAY NOT work - but look what happens if you or your loved
one gets forced into cardiac bypass surgery by the medical powers-that-be...

According to Judge Wolff, cardiac bypass has "an operative mortality rate of
between two and 30 percent, depending on where you are in the United States,
and mental impairment occurs in as many as 18 percent of cardiac bypass
patients...."

Here is a fuller excerpt of what Judge Wolff wrote...

"The board conceded that there was no evidence of harm from chelation
therapy. In the 35 years that he has used chelation therapy, Dr. McDonagh
reports that the therapy has not resulted in infection, injury, or death for
any of his patients. The commission repeatedly found that chelation therapy
'harms no one' and provides 'benefit to many patients'...In contrast,
according to the commission, cardiac bypass surgery -- an approved therapy
for severe athlerosclerosis -- has an operative mortality rate of between
two and 30 percent, depending on where you are in the United States, and
mental impairment occurs in as many as 18 percent of cardiac bypass
patients...."

I *LIKE* THIS JUDGE! (Judge Wolff)...

Here's his WHOLE OPINION (accessed on the web, Thursday, March 24, 2005)

Opinion Concurring In Part And Dissenting In Part by Judge Wolff: I concur
that section 490.065 sets the standards for admissibility and use of expert
testimony. Because I believe that the Administrative Hearing Commission was
correct in concluding that Dr. McDonagh was not subject to discipline for
any of the acts alleged by the State Board of Registration for the Healing
Arts, I would affirm the commission's decision, as the circuit court did.
I write separately to offer advice to lawyers on expert witnesses and gentle
advice for the board on the future of this case against Dr. McDonagh.
Advice for Lawyers on Expert Witnesses
The principal opinion's discussion of section 490.065 is worth reading for
its excellent legal analysis. I would only add a helpful summary for
practitioners in Missouri courts and administrative agencies:
Forget Frye. Forget Daubert. Read the statute. Section 490.065 is written,
conveniently, in English. (FN1) It has 204 words. Those straightforward
statutory words are all you really need to know about the admissibility of
expert testimony in civil proceedings. Section 490.065 allows expert opinion
testimony where "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact... "(FN2)
Dr. McDonagh and the physicians he called as expert witnesses surely were
"qualified" as experts by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education...." The board argued that these witnesses' testimony was
inadmissible under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye
was remarkably beside the point.
Neither party gave the statute due regard. The board conceded that the
testimony of Dr. McDonagh and his experts was admissible under section
490.065 but inadmissible under Frye. Why would an 80-year-old federal court
of appeals case trump a Missouri statute directly on point?
Dr. McDonagh argued, by contrast, that the applicable standard was that of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Again,
why would a Missouri statute directly on point be disregarded in favor of a
United States Supreme Court decision on the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
have not been adopted in Missouri?
What I think the parties are trying to get to is the relevant standard of
care, discussed in the principal opinion. There is a problem he in the
proceedings before the commission, the board raised only the general
objection that Dr. McDonagh's expert evidence would not qualify under Frye.
The board did not object to any specific testimony from Dr. McDonagh or his
experts. The board also did not raise the point it now presses in this
appeal -- that Dr. McDonagh's experts did not define the standard used when
they stated that his use of chelation therapy was in accord with the
"standard of care." The board's evidentiary motion before the commission
made no reference to "standard of care," nor did the board take the
opportunity to cross-examine Dr. McDonagh's expert witnesses as to the
standard of care. It was not Dr. McDonagh's burden to establish the relevant
standard of care.
But the question of "standard of care" may be beside the point, as I will
discuss in the next section in offering advice to the board.
Advice for the Healing Arts Board
The board should drop this case. It should not waste another dollar of
public money on its case against Dr. McDonagh.
The board's case against Dr. McDonagh is premised on its contention that Dr.
McDonagh's use of chelation therapy constitutes repeated negligence for
which he should be disciplined. The board lost its case before the
administrative hearing commission and then appealed to the circuit court,
where it also lost.
Less than a month after the board filed its notice of appeal in 2001, the
board promulgated a rule, 4 CSR 150-2.165, that declares the use of
chelation on a patient is of "no medical or osteopathic value" except for
such uses as approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The
rule also says that the board "shall not seek disciplinary action" against a
licensee where the licensee uses a patient consent form prescribed by the
rule.
The board concedes, and the principal opinion appropriately notes, that the
consent form that Dr. McDonagh has used for many years is very similar to
the consent form in the board's rule.
How can the board take the position that Dr. McDonagh's practice was
repeatedly negligent under the disciplinary statute, section 334.100, when
the board has a rule saying that it will not seek discipline against
physicians engaging in this practice? What, exactly, is the standard of
care?
The real question is: Is the healing arts board's use of section 334.100,
which prescribes discipline for repeated acts of "negligence," an
inappropriate use of the disciplinary process to impose the board's sense of
orthodoxy?(FN3)
Dr. McDonagh's use of chelation therapy to treat atherosclerosis and other
vascular diseases may be unorthodox. None of the mainstream medical
organizations endorse its use for vascular diseases. But, until 2001 --
after the acts the board complains of in this proceeding -- there was no law
or regulation regulating its use. Chelation therapy, which consists of
administering the drug EDTA intravenously, is standard treatment for removal
of heavy metals from the body. The FDA approves the chelation therapy
medications for this use. Its use in attempting to clear vascular blockage
is called an "off-label" use, referring to the use of a standard therapy for
another purpose. There are many off-label uses of medicines that are
generally accepted by the medical profession.
An organization called the American College for Advancement in Medicine,
consisting of about 1,000 physicians worldwide including Dr. McDonagh,
endorses the off-label use of chelation therapy, along with various vitamins
and minerals, for treating vascular disease.
The administrative hearing commission heard evidence for eight days on the
board's complaint against Dr. McDonagh for his use of chelation therapy and
related matters. (FN4) The commission, in its 70 pages of findings of fact
and conclusions of law, found no cause for discipline.
Specifically responding to the board's position that the use of chelation
therapy is cause for discipline, the commission concluded: "It is not an
unnecessary, harmful or dangerous treatment." The commission characterized
McDonagh's conduct as "giving patients a treatment that has provided benefit
to many patients, harms no one, and is given with informed consent and the
information that this treatment may not work with all patients." The
commission further stated, "[T]he evidence shows that patients are being
helped. We cannot state that an entire treatment method that provides
benefits to patients without harming them constitutes incompetent,
inappropriate, grossly negligent, or negligent treatment. Nor can we say
that this treatment is misconduct, unprofessional, or a danger to the
public."
The commission, based on the record, does acknowledge that chelation therapy
involves risks, as of course do other treatments for vascular disease, such
as coronary artery surgery. The risks of chelation therapy are disclosed,
according to the commission, in the informed consent form that Dr. McDonagh
has used with all his patients. The form gives notice that chelation therapy
for vascular disease is not approved by the FDA, the American Medical
Association, or others. It lists possible benefits, but also notes "you may
not receive all of these benefits as they do not occur predictably with
every patient and in some cases may not occur at all." Dr. McDonagh tells
his patients that "the treatment will work better if the patient follows the
diet, exercise and nutritional supplements that are recommended," according
to the commission's findings.
There are scientific studies discussed in the commission's findings as to
the efficacy of chelation therapy for vascular conditions. The mainstream
organizations accept the conclusions of studies that found no value in
treating vascular disease by chelation therapy. Dr. McDonagh and other
like-minded physicians, including their American College for Advancement in
Medicine, cite case reports and studies -- arguably of less validity than
the studies relied upon by the mainstream -- that show benefits in such use
of chelation therapy.
There is a provision of section 334.100 that would seem to cover unorthodox
treatments that are of no value. Section 334.100.4(f) provides for
discipline where a licensee performs or prescribes "medical services which
have been declared by board rule to be of no medical or osteopathic value."
But the board did not have a rule against chelation therapy that would apply
to Dr. McDonagh's acts, which occurred from 1978 to 1996. The board, long
after the acts included in its complaint against Dr. McDonagh, promulgated a
rule relating to chelation therapy, 4 CSR 150-2.165 (Effective October 30,
2001), quoted in full in the principal opinion.
More to the point, when the board finally promulgated its rule that declares
chelation therapy to be "of no medical or osteopathic value," the board's
rule goes on to provide that the board "shall not seek disciplinary action
against a licensee based solely upon a non-approved use of EDTA chelation if
the licensee has the patient sign" the informed consent form that
accompanies the regulation. As noted here and in the principal opinion, the
consent form that Dr. McDonagh used for these patients -- long before the
consent form promulgated by the board -- is very similar to the consent form
accompanying the 2001 rule.
At this point, the question becomes: what's going on here? In fairness to
the board, I should note that the hearing before the administrative hearing
commission in Dr. McDonagh's case was held in 1997, four years before the
board promulgated its rule. But it seems strange that the board, having lost
in the commission and in the circuit court, would press its claims on appeal
after publishing the 2001 rule that undercuts its position.
As to the board's claims heard in 1997 that are the subject of this appeal,
it appears that the absence of a rule left the board to proceed against Dr.
McDonagh under 334.100.2(5) for repeated acts of negligence. The board's
complaint alleged that Dr. McDonagh's practice of chelation therapy
constituted repeated negligence in violation of section 334.100.2. Section
334.100.2(5) allows for discipline for "any conduct or practice which is or
might be harmful or dangerous to the mental or physical health of a patient
or the public," and for "incompetency, gross negligence or repeated
negligence" in professional duties. Section 334.100.2(5) defines "repeated
negligence" as "the failure, on more than one occasion, to use that degree
of skill and learning ordinarily used under the same or similar
circumstances by the member of the applicant's or licensee's profession."
This definition establishes the legal standard of care that must be applied
in determining the board's claims of repeated negligence.
So is this off-label use of chelation therapy negligence? The real
question -- the answer to which is fatal to the board's position -- is
whether acts of negligence, as defined by this statute, can be cause for
discipline if there is no showing that the physician's conduct "is or might
be harmful or dangerous." If there is no harm or danger, there is no cause
for discipline under this section. Section 334.100.2(5) is a catchall
provision; read in the context of the entire statute, it does not make
negligent acts actionable unless there is harm or danger. (FN5) This
subdivision cannot be read to make acts subject to discipline where there is
no prospect of harm. If it were so read, the reading would make superfluous
other provisions of the statute, such as 334.100.2(4)(f) as to treatments
deemed by rule to have no medical value. There are provisions in section
334.100, including 334.100.2(4)(f), for disciplining medical quackery --
even where it causes no harm. But section 334.100.2(5), under which the
board complains of Dr. McDonagh's practice, is not one of those sections.
Under section 334.100.2(5), no harm, no foul.
Physicians are afforded considerable leeway in the use of professional
judgment to decide on appropriate treatments, especially when applying the
negligence standard. For instance, Hasse v. Garfinkel, 418 S.W.2d 108, 114
(Mo. 1967), a medical negligence case, holds that "as long as there is room
for an honest difference of opinion among competent physicians, a physician
who uses his own best judgment cannot be convicted of negligence, even
though it may afterward develop that he was mistaken." "Negligence" does not
seem an appropriate concept where the physician has studied the problem and
has made a treatment recommendation, even though that is not the prevailing
view of the majority of the profession. The lack of general acceptance of a
treatment does not necessarily constitute a breach of the standard of care.
The use of negligence in licensing situations, in the absence of harm or
danger, is particularly inappropriate.
One could argue that because chelation therapy is not accepted by mainstream
medicine and is an off-label practice not approved by the FDA, it is
therefore harmful and dangerous. If that were the board's position, the
licensing statute would thwart advances in medical science. A dramatic
example is the treatment of stomach ulcers, which were long thought to be
caused by stress. In 1982, two Australians found the bacterium helicobacter
pylori in the stomach linings of ulcer victims. Because helicobacter pylori
is a bacterium, some physicians -- a minority to be sure -- began
prescribing antibiotics to treat stomach ulcers as an infectious disease.
The National Institutes of Health did not recognize antibiotic therapy until
1994; the FDA approved the first antibiotic for use in treating stomach
ulcers in 1996; and the Centers for Disease Control began publicizing the
treatment in 1997. Today's physicians accept as fact that most stomach
ulcers are primarily caused by helicobacter pylori bacteria infection and
not by stress. (FN6) But, by the chronology of this discovery, if a
physician in the late 1980s or early 1990s had treated ulcers with
antibiotics, that treatment would have been "negligent" as the board in this
case interprets that term because inappropriate use of antibiotics can be
dangerous.
I do not mean to suggest that chelation therapy for vascular disease is of
the same order as the use of antibiotics for treating stomach ulcers. In
fact, I doubt it. But my point is that medicine is not readily regulated by
a standard cookbook or set of rules. The board's position in publishing its
2001 rule on chelation therapy seems to recognize this point better than its
position in this disciplinary action. If chelation therapy for vascular
disease were dangerous, the board's rule that allows its use would be
unconscionable.
In Dr. McDonagh's practice, all of his patients signed a consent to medical
treatment and agreement that discusses the positive and negative aspects of
chelation therapy and possible side effects. The patients are told that the
therapy is not approved by the FDA, AMA or others. The patients consented
nonetheless. Some of Dr. McDonagh's patients chose chelation therapy after
exhausting more traditional medical treatments. Some may have benefited,
perhaps because Dr. McDonagh accompanied the chelation treatment with
recommendations for diet and exercise that are well known to be helpful for
preventing and resolving some vascular disease. The record shows no harm to
any patient.
In the absence of harm, or the probability of harm, can the repeated
negligence standard of the licensing statute legitimately be used to enforce
the board's opinion of what is conventional and, therefore, acceptable
medicine?
The board conceded that there was no evidence of harm from chelation
therapy. In the 35 years that he has used chelation therapy, Dr. McDonagh
reports that the therapy has not resulted in infection, injury, or death for
any of his patients. The commission repeatedly found that chelation therapy
"harms no one" and provides "benefit to many patients." (FN7)
Medicine is an art, as well as a science, as its practitioners are taught.
It is also a dynamic field, where beliefs about what is conventional therapy
can change over time. What is effective treatment is often a combination,
not just of art and science, but of belief. The patient may get better if
the patient is convinced of the usefulness of the therapy. The commission
concluded that some of Dr. McDonagh's patients got better. Even if it is
hard to believe these patients got better because of chelation therapy, the
fact that some of Dr. McDonagh's patients got better is hardly cause for
discipline. On this record, the absence of harm from chelation therapy, as I
read the statute, negates the board's claim of repeated negligence.
Nor can it be said that the board or the commission believes that Dr.
McDonagh's practice constitutes a danger to the public. The board has the
power to move quickly to end practices that it considers dangerous. Section
334.102. The board sought no such immediate action.
This disciplinary action has, if anything, been conducted in slow motion.
The healing arts board in 1989 apparently studied chelation therapy and
issued a public statement that it chose "to take no action concerning
chelation therapy" and would consider cases as they arose. Its first
complaint against Dr. McDonagh was filed in 1994 but later dismissed without
prejudice. The current complaint, in 13 counts, covers practices going back
to 1978 and was filed in 1996. As noted, the current case was tried before
the commission in 1997, but the commission's decision was not issued until
2000. There has been a noticeable lack of urgency by all concerned.
If this matter comes before the commission on remand, the commission is to
review the evidence on the basis of the evidentiary principles in section
490.065. In my view, the commission should reach the same conclusion as
before. In any event, to the extent that Dr. McDonagh's practice -- though
it pre-dated the board's 2001 regulation -- conformed to the board's
regulation on chelation, the board ought to be bound by its own standard.
Dr. McDonagh has not yet raised the issue of whether the board should be
bound by its own standard as expressed in its 2001 rule. But he will have
the opportunity to do so on remand.
This case needs to be over. The board should end the case itself rather than
suffer the indignity of further adverse commission and judicial rulings, to
say nothing of the waste of public resources that such proceedings will
entail.

Footnotes:

FN1. All statutory references are to RSMo 2000.

FN2. Section 490.065, in its entirety, provides:

1. In any civil action, if scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.

2. Testimony by such an expert witness in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.

3. The facts or data in a particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or
before the hearing and must be of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject and must be
otherwise reasonably reliable.

4. If a reasonable foundation is laid, an expert may testify in terms of
opinion or inference and give the reasons therefor without the use of
hypothetical questions, unless the court believes the use of a hypothetical
question will make the expert's opinion more understandable or of greater
assistance to the jury due to the particular facts of the case.

FN3. Section 334.100.2 provides, in pertinent part:

The board may cause a complaint to be filed with the administrative hearing
commission as provided by chapter 621, RSMo, against any holder of any
certificate of registration or authority, permit or license required by this
chapter or any person who has failed to renew or has surrendered the
person's certificate of registration or authority, permit or license for any
one or any combination of the following causes: (5) Any conduct or practice
which is or might be harmful or dangerous to the mental or physical health
of a patient or the public; or incompetency, gross negligence or repeated
negligence in the performance of the function or duties of any profession
licensed or regulated by this chapter. For the purposes of this subdivision,
"repeated negligence" means the failure, on more than one occasion, to use
that degree of skill and learning ordinarily used under the same or similar
circumstances by the member of the applicant's or licensee's profession[.]

FN4. The board's complaint also relates to record keeping and use of
diagnostic tests, but these charges seem to be premised on the board's
objection to Dr. McDonagh's practice of chelation therapy for treating
vascular disease. There may be a question whether Dr. McDonagh ordered
unnecessary tests, without reference to chelation therapy, or whether the
tests Dr. McDonagh ordered were deemed by the board to be unnecessary
because they were part of chelation therapy that the board believes is
useless.

FN5. For those who like the comfort of case citations, Missouri's common law
of negligence is consistent with this reading of section 334.100.2. In
common law actions for negligence, the concept of negligence is inextricably
linked to the causation of harm. All actions for negligence require a
plaintiff to establish that "the defendant had a duty to protect her from
injury, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the defendant's
failure directly and proximately caused her injury." Robinson v. Health
Midwest Development Group, 58 S.W.3d 519, 521 (Mo. banc 2001). For a medical
negligence action, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant failed to use
that degree of skill and learning ordinarily used under the same or similar
circumstances by members of defendant's profession and that the negligent
act or acts caused plaintiff's injury. Washington by Washington v. Barnes
Hosp., 897 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Mo. banc 1995).

FN6. The treatment of stomach ulcers by antibiotic therapy is cited as one
of the top innovations in medicine in the past 25 years in a study sponsored
by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Henry Kaiser Foundation. Its
conclusions are summarized at www.MedTech1.com.

FN7. In contrast, according to the commission, cardiac bypass surgery -- an
approved therapy for severe athlerosclerosis -- has an operative mortality
rate of between two and 30 percent, depending on where you are in the United
States, and mental impairment occurs in as many as 18 percent of cardiac
bypass patients.




This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final
opinion adopted by the Court.

END Judge Wolff's opinion
http://www.courts.mo.gov/courts/pubo...ght=0,McDonagh

MISSOURI MEDICAL BOARD (State Board of Regisration for the Healing Arts)


Women should not have to ASK for the "extra" up to 30% of pelvic outlet
area - most women don't even know OBs are robbing it!

Nor should women have to ask for the "extra" up to 50% of blood volume for
their babies!

The board must move quickly to end these dangerous OB practices.

Again, that key quote from Judge Wolff:

"The board has the power to move quickly to end practices that it considers
dangerous. Section 334.102."

I hope robbing people of up to 50% of their blood volume is considered
dangerous in Missouri.

Thanks for reading everyone.

Sincerely,

Todd

Dr. Gastaldo


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