Some good news?

I hope this is really as good as it sounds!
~AZ~

Posted from another group:


Recently in California, the Supreme Court has allowed
a decision to stand regarding the overturning of
paternity fraud. I have copies of the actual briefs
filed in the case ready for similar use in other
states and jurisdictions. The County of Los Angeles
moved to have the Supreme Court depublish the case in
order to deprive its use as precedent.

What is important is that the decision states that
although the statutory time for default set aside had
passed, the law required the default to be set aside
and that the County is obligated to act for the public
good.

This has been a long time coming and many individuals
and groups acted in concert and rose to the occasion
to prevent the depublication of the decision. Hooray
for working together to accomplish what any one of us
could not have done on our own.

For the edification of the reader, below is the actual
decision. There are two important decisions therein:
1) Man who was proved not to be father of two boys was
entitled to relief from default judgment establishing
his parental relationship and ordering him to pay
support, even though his motion for relief was
untimely, and any fraud on mother's part did not
entitle him to relief; family law required county to
correct child support mistakes, and man always denied
being father and never established relationship with
boys. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 473(b); and, 2) A
county, a political embodiment of its citizens and
inhabitants, must always act in the public interest
and for the general good.

Wow! Read that second one again!

Larry Hellmann, President National Congress for
Fathers and Children





120 Cal.App.4th 246, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905

Court of Appeal, Second District,

Division 8.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Manuel NAVARRO, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B155166.

June 30, 2004.


Background: After blood tests proved that man was not
father of two boys, man moved to set aside default
judgment establishing his parental relationship and
ordering him to pay support. The Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, No. BY119238, James B. Copelan,
Temporary Judge, denied man's motion. He appealed.

Holding: The Court of Appeal, Rubin, J., held that man
was entitled to relief from default.

Reversed.

**906 *247 Linda S. Ferrer for Defendant and
Appellant.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney; Phillip Browning,
Director, L. Cruz, Deputy Director, Nancy K. Ruffolo,
Attorney in Charge, and Fesia A. Davenport, Staff
Attorney, Child Support Services Department, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.


RUBIN, J.
Manuel Navarro appeals from the trial court's denial
of his motion to vacate a default judgment entered
against him in 1996. The judgment established his
parental relationship with two boys whom respondent
County of Los Angeles now concedes are not his sons,
and ordered him to pay child support. He seeks
reimbursement of child support, welfare
reimbursements, attorneys fees, and costs. We reverse.

*248 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 1996, the Bureau of Family Support Operations
in the District Attorney's Office [FN1] (the County)
filed a complaint to establish the paternity and child
support obligations of "Manuel Nava" for two boys born
in December 1995 who had been receiving public
assistance. The County attempted substitute service of
the complaint in May 1996 by leaving a copy at
appellant's address with "Jane Doe," listed as
"sister" and "co-tenant" and serving a copy by first
class mail. The complaint alerted appellant of the
danger of not answering the complaint if he denied
paternity, and warned he could become liable for child
support if the court determined he was the boys'
father. Appellant did not answer the complaint and the
County took his default in July 1996. The court
thereafter entered judgment establishing appellant's
paternity and ordered him to pay $247 in monthly child
support.

FN1. Pursuant to Family Code section 17304, on July 1,
2001, the County of Los Angeles Child Support Services
Department replaced the District Attorney's Bureau of
Family Support Operations as the County agency charged
with establishing parentage, obtaining and enforcing
orders for support.



Five years later in July 2001 appellant filed a motion
to set aside the judgment and have his answer deemed
filed because a recent genetic blood test indisputably
proved he was not the boys' father. He claimed that
although he lived at the address cited on the
complaint's proof of service, and he never attempted
to avoid service, he nonetheless never received a copy
of the summons and complaint or default judgment. In
support of his motion, he noted that blood tests in a
separate paternity action in San Bernardino County had
conclusively proven a few months earlier that he was
not the boys' father. Based on those tests, San
Bernardino County authorities had dismissed their
paternity suit against him with prejudice.
Acknowledging the six-month period for setting aside
the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473
had long passed, he argued relief was nevertheless
proper because the boys' mother had committed
extrinsic fraud in asserting he was the father when in
fact he was not, thus depriving him of a fair
adversarial hearing.
The County opposed the motion, arguing appellant had
not shown extrinsic fraud or mistake. According to the
County, the **907 mother's mere assertion that he was
the father was insufficient to establish extrinsic
fraud. Apparently agreeing with the County, the court
denied appellant's motion to set aside the judgment.
This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

By strict application of the law, appellant should be
denied relief. He did not file his motion to set aside
the County's default judgment *249 against him until
five years after its entry, long past the maximum six
months allowed for setting aside a default judgment.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Furthermore,
appellant cannot win relief under the doctrine of
extrinsic fraud because mother's false assertion that
he was the boys' father is not the sort of falsehood
the doctrine encompasses. (See, e.g., Kachig v. Boothe
(1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 632-633, 99 Cal.Rptr. 393.)
In sum, a narrow, technical reading of the controlling
case law and statutes, with their emphasis on the
public interest in the finality of judgments, suggests
the trial court ruled correctly.
Sometimes even more important policies than the
finality of judgments are at stake, however. Mistakes
do happen, and a profound mistake occurred here when
appellant was charged with being the boys' father, an
error the County concedes. Instead of remedying its
mistake, the County retreats behind the procedural
redoubt offered by the passage of time since it took
appellant's default. [FN2]

FN2. We recognize that finality and certainty assume
greater importance when the issue is paternity in a
long-standing parent-child relationship, for then the
child's psychological well being is at stake. Here,
however, the issue is solely the cold-hard cash of
child support, as appellant has always denied
paternity and has no relationship with the boys. In
this dispute over money, the greater equities lie with
appellant, who has no relationship with the boys, than
with the County, whose obligation to the general
welfare compelled it to support the boys when their
real father did not.



It is this state's policy that when a mistake occurs
in a child support action, the County must correct it,
not exploit it. When the Legislature enacted the Child
Support Enforcement Fairness Act of 2000, it declared
"The efficient and fair enforcement of child support
orders is essential to ensuring compliance with those
orders and respect for the administration of
justice.... Thousands of individuals each year are
mistakenly identified as being liable for child
support actions. As a result of that action, the
ability to earn a living is severely impaired, assets
are seized, and family relationships are often
destroyed. It is the moral, legal, and ethical
obligation of all enforcement agencies to take prompt
action to recognize those cases where a person is
mistakenly identified as a support obligor in order to
minimize the harm and correct any injustice to that
person." (Stats.1999, ch. 653 (A.B.380), italics
added.)



The County, a political embodiment of its citizens and
inhabitants, must always act in the public interest
and for the general good. It should not enforce child
support judgments it knows to be unfounded. And in
particular, it should not ask the courts to assist it
in doing so. Despite the Legislature's clear directive
that child support agencies not pursue mistaken child
support actions, the County persists in asking that we
do so. We will not sully our *250 hands by
participating in an unjust, and factually unfounded,
result. We say no to the County, and we reverse.

DISPOSITION

The order denying appellant's motion to set aside the
default judgment is reversed. **908 Each side to bear
their own costs on appeal.

We concur: COOPER, P.J., and BOLAND, J.
Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2004.
County of Los Angeles v. Navarro
120 Cal.App.4th 246, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905, 4 Cal. Daily
Op. Serv. 5951, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8069


=====
Larry Hellmann, President
National Congress for Fathers and Children
550 West Vista Way, Suite 404
Vista, CA 92083
(760) 758-0268; Fax - 758-9557

Woohoo! This *IS* good news!

Now, can this judgement be used to aid those falsely accused in states
other than California?

- Ron ^*^


AZ Astrea wrote:

I hope this is really as good as it sounds!
~AZ~

Posted from another group:


Recently in California, the Supreme Court has allowed
a decision to stand regarding the overturning of
paternity fraud. I have copies of the actual briefs
filed in the case ready for similar use in other
states and jurisdictions. The County of Los Angeles
moved to have the Supreme Court depublish the case in
order to deprive its use as precedent.

What is important is that the decision states that
although the statutory time for default set aside had
passed, the law required the default to be set aside
and that the County is obligated to act for the public
good.

This has been a long time coming and many individuals
and groups acted in concert and rose to the occasion
to prevent the depublication of the decision. Hooray
for working together to accomplish what any one of us
could not have done on our own.

For the edification of the reader, below is the actual
decision. There are two important decisions therein:
1) Man who was proved not to be father of two boys was
entitled to relief from default judgment establishing
his parental relationship and ordering him to pay
support, even though his motion for relief was
untimely, and any fraud on mother's part did not
entitle him to relief; family law required county to
correct child support mistakes, and man always denied
being father and never established relationship with
boys. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 473(b); and, 2) A
county, a political embodiment of its citizens and
inhabitants, must always act in the public interest
and for the general good.

Wow! Read that second one again!

Larry Hellmann, President National Congress for
Fathers and Children





120 Cal.App.4th 246, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905

Court of Appeal, Second District,

Division 8.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Manuel NAVARRO, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B155166.

June 30, 2004.


Background: After blood tests proved that man was not
father of two boys, man moved to set aside default
judgment establishing his parental relationship and
ordering him to pay support. The Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, No. BY119238, James B. Copelan,
Temporary Judge, denied man's motion. He appealed.

Holding: The Court of Appeal, Rubin, J., held that man
was entitled to relief from default.

Reversed.

**906 *247 Linda S. Ferrer for Defendant and
Appellant.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney; Phillip Browning,
Director, L. Cruz, Deputy Director, Nancy K. Ruffolo,
Attorney in Charge, and Fesia A. Davenport, Staff
Attorney, Child Support Services Department, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.


RUBIN, J.
Manuel Navarro appeals from the trial court's denial
of his motion to vacate a default judgment entered
against him in 1996. The judgment established his
parental relationship with two boys whom respondent
County of Los Angeles now concedes are not his sons,
and ordered him to pay child support. He seeks
reimbursement of child support, welfare
reimbursements, attorneys fees, and costs. We reverse.

*248 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 1996, the Bureau of Family Support Operations
in the District Attorney's Office [FN1] (the County)
filed a complaint to establish the paternity and child
support obligations of "Manuel Nava" for two boys born
in December 1995 who had been receiving public
assistance. The County attempted substitute service of
the complaint in May 1996 by leaving a copy at
appellant's address with "Jane Doe," listed as
"sister" and "co-tenant" and serving a copy by first
class mail. The complaint alerted appellant of the
danger of not answering the complaint if he denied
paternity, and warned he could become liable for child
support if the court determined he was the boys'
father. Appellant did not answer the complaint and the
County took his default in July 1996. The court
thereafter entered judgment establishing appellant's
paternity and ordered him to pay $247 in monthly child
support.

FN1. Pursuant to Family Code section 17304, on July 1,
2001, the County of Los Angeles Child Support Services
Department replaced the District Attorney's Bureau of
Family Support Operations as the County agency charged
with establishing parentage, obtaining and enforcing
orders for support.



Five years later in July 2001 appellant filed a motion
to set aside the judgment and have his answer deemed
filed because a recent genetic blood test indisputably
proved he was not the boys' father. He claimed that
although he lived at the address cited on the
complaint's proof of service, and he never attempted
to avoid service, he nonetheless never received a copy
of the summons and complaint or default judgment. In
support of his motion, he noted that blood tests in a
separate paternity action in San Bernardino County had
conclusively proven a few months earlier that he was
not the boys' father. Based on those tests, San
Bernardino County authorities had dismissed their
paternity suit against him with prejudice.
Acknowledging the six-month period for setting aside
the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473
had long passed, he argued relief was nevertheless
proper because the boys' mother had committed
extrinsic fraud in asserting he was the father when in
fact he was not, thus depriving him of a fair
adversarial hearing.
The County opposed the motion, arguing appellant had
not shown extrinsic fraud or mistake. According to the
County, the **907 mother's mere assertion that he was
the father was insufficient to establish extrinsic
fraud. Apparently agreeing with the County, the court
denied appellant's motion to set aside the judgment.
This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

By strict application of the law, appellant should be
denied relief. He did not file his motion to set aside
the County's default judgment *249 against him until
five years after its entry, long past the maximum six
months allowed for setting aside a default judgment.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Furthermore,
appellant cannot win relief under the doctrine of
extrinsic fraud because mother's false assertion that
he was the boys' father is not the sort of falsehood
the doctrine encompasses. (See, e.g., Kachig v. Boothe
(1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 632-633, 99 Cal.Rptr. 393.)
In sum, a narrow, technical reading of the controlling
case law and statutes, with their emphasis on the
public interest in the finality of judgments, suggests
the trial court ruled correctly.
Sometimes even more important policies than the
finality of judgments are at stake, however. Mistakes
do happen, and a profound mistake occurred here when
appellant was charged with being the boys' father, an
error the County concedes. Instead of remedying its
mistake, the County retreats behind the procedural
redoubt offered by the passage of time since it took
appellant's default. [FN2]

FN2. We recognize that finality and certainty assume
greater importance when the issue is paternity in a
long-standing parent-child relationship, for then the
child's psychological well being is at stake. Here,
however, the issue is solely the cold-hard cash of
child support, as appellant has always denied
paternity and has no relationship with the boys. In
this dispute over money, the greater equities lie with
appellant, who has no relationship with the boys, than
with the County, whose obligation to the general
welfare compelled it to support the boys when their
real father did not.



It is this state's policy that when a mistake occurs
in a child support action, the County must correct it,
not exploit it. When the Legislature enacted the Child
Support Enforcement Fairness Act of 2000, it declared
"The efficient and fair enforcement of child support
orders is essential to ensuring compliance with those
orders and respect for the administration of
justice.... Thousands of individuals each year are
mistakenly identified as being liable for child
support actions. As a result of that action, the
ability to earn a living is severely impaired, assets
are seized, and family relationships are often
destroyed. It is the moral, legal, and ethical
obligation of all enforcement agencies to take prompt
action to recognize those cases where a person is
mistakenly identified as a support obligor in order to
minimize the harm and correct any injustice to that
person." (Stats.1999, ch. 653 (A.B.380), italics
added.)



The County, a political embodiment of its citizens and
inhabitants, must always act in the public interest
and for the general good. It should not enforce child
support judgments it knows to be unfounded. And in
particular, it should not ask the courts to assist it
in doing so. Despite the Legislature's clear directive
that child support agencies not pursue mistaken child
support actions, the County persists in asking that we
do so. We will not sully our *250 hands by
participating in an unjust, and factually unfounded,
result. We say no to the County, and we reverse.

DISPOSITION

The order denying appellant's motion to set aside the
default judgment is reversed. **908 Each side to bear
their own costs on appeal.

We concur: COOPER, P.J., and BOLAND, J.
Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2004.
County of Los Angeles v. Navarro
120 Cal.App.4th 246, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905, 4 Cal. Daily
Op. Serv. 5951, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8069


=====
Larry Hellmann, President
National Congress for Fathers and Children
550 West Vista Way, Suite 404
Vista, CA 92083
(760) 758-0268; Fax - 758-9557

What has happened now in this case is that the California Supreme Court
has refused to review a decision of the Court of Appeal, Second District,
thus protecting a man in a paternity fraud situation. But will he get his
money back? I very much doubt it.

The Court of Appeal decision may have value as a precedent. So it MAY
be good news.

However, consider the following. There is a reference in the court
decision to the fact that "strict application of the law" would prevent the
man from getting relief from the child support order because he waited five
years before seeking it. In other words, California law ALLOWS the mother
to perpetrate paternity fraud in order to get money from this man, and
ALLOWS the County of Los Angeles to help her to do so. The judges simply
ignored the terms of the law, because the facts of this case were so
outrageous.

The judges' ruling in this case undoubtedly reflected natural justice.
However, I do not believe that in general judges should be allowed to
disregard the plain meaning and intention of the law. Their jobs should not
be to decide what they think should be in the law. In one sense this ruling
is only another illustration of the fact that judges are one of the biggest
categories of scofflaws in the U.S.

The answer is to change the law -- not to rely on the hope that other
judges will follow this precedent, which appears to be based on nothing
other than the gut feelings of these judges.


"AZ Astrea" wrote in message
...
I hope this is really as good as it sounds!
~AZ~

Posted from another group:


Recently in California, the Supreme Court has allowed
a decision to stand regarding the overturning of
paternity fraud. I have copies of the actual briefs
filed in the case ready for similar use in other
states and jurisdictions. The County of Los Angeles
moved to have the Supreme Court depublish the case in
order to deprive its use as precedent.

What is important is that the decision states that
although the statutory time for default set aside had
passed, the law required the default to be set aside
and that the County is obligated to act for the public
good.

This has been a long time coming and many individuals
and groups acted in concert and rose to the occasion
to prevent the depublication of the decision. Hooray
for working together to accomplish what any one of us
could not have done on our own.

For the edification of the reader, below is the actual
decision. There are two important decisions therein:
1) Man who was proved not to be father of two boys was
entitled to relief from default judgment establishing
his parental relationship and ordering him to pay
support, even though his motion for relief was
untimely, and any fraud on mother's part did not
entitle him to relief; family law required county to
correct child support mistakes, and man always denied
being father and never established relationship with
boys. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 473(b); and, 2) A
county, a political embodiment of its citizens and
inhabitants, must always act in the public interest
and for the general good.

Wow! Read that second one again!

Larry Hellmann, President National Congress for
Fathers and Children





120 Cal.App.4th 246, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905

Court of Appeal, Second District,

Division 8.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Manuel NAVARRO, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B155166.

June 30, 2004.


Background: After blood tests proved that man was not
father of two boys, man moved to set aside default
judgment establishing his parental relationship and
ordering him to pay support. The Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, No. BY119238, James B. Copelan,
Temporary Judge, denied man's motion. He appealed.

Holding: The Court of Appeal, Rubin, J., held that man
was entitled to relief from default.

Reversed.

**906 *247 Linda S. Ferrer for Defendant and
Appellant.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney; Phillip Browning,
Director, L. Cruz, Deputy Director, Nancy K. Ruffolo,
Attorney in Charge, and Fesia A. Davenport, Staff
Attorney, Child Support Services Department, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.


RUBIN, J.
Manuel Navarro appeals from the trial court's denial
of his motion to vacate a default judgment entered
against him in 1996. The judgment established his
parental relationship with two boys whom respondent
County of Los Angeles now concedes are not his sons,
and ordered him to pay child support. He seeks
reimbursement of child support, welfare
reimbursements, attorneys fees, and costs. We reverse.

*248 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 1996, the Bureau of Family Support Operations
in the District Attorney's Office [FN1] (the County)
filed a complaint to establish the paternity and child
support obligations of "Manuel Nava" for two boys born
in December 1995 who had been receiving public
assistance. The County attempted substitute service of
the complaint in May 1996 by leaving a copy at
appellant's address with "Jane Doe," listed as
"sister" and "co-tenant" and serving a copy by first
class mail. The complaint alerted appellant of the
danger of not answering the complaint if he denied
paternity, and warned he could become liable for child
support if the court determined he was the boys'
father. Appellant did not answer the complaint and the
County took his default in July 1996. The court
thereafter entered judgment establishing appellant's
paternity and ordered him to pay $247 in monthly child
support.

FN1. Pursuant to Family Code section 17304, on July 1,
2001, the County of Los Angeles Child Support Services
Department replaced the District Attorney's Bureau of
Family Support Operations as the County agency charged
with establishing parentage, obtaining and enforcing
orders for support.



Five years later in July 2001 appellant filed a motion
to set aside the judgment and have his answer deemed
filed because a recent genetic blood test indisputably
proved he was not the boys' father. He claimed that
although he lived at the address cited on the
complaint's proof of service, and he never attempted
to avoid service, he nonetheless never received a copy
of the summons and complaint or default judgment. In
support of his motion, he noted that blood tests in a
separate paternity action in San Bernardino County had
conclusively proven a few months earlier that he was
not the boys' father. Based on those tests, San
Bernardino County authorities had dismissed their
paternity suit against him with prejudice.
Acknowledging the six-month period for setting aside
the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473
had long passed, he argued relief was nevertheless
proper because the boys' mother had committed
extrinsic fraud in asserting he was the father when in
fact he was not, thus depriving him of a fair
adversarial hearing.
The County opposed the motion, arguing appellant had
not shown extrinsic fraud or mistake. According to the
County, the **907 mother's mere assertion that he was
the father was insufficient to establish extrinsic
fraud. Apparently agreeing with the County, the court
denied appellant's motion to set aside the judgment.
This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

By strict application of the law, appellant should be
denied relief. He did not file his motion to set aside
the County's default judgment *249 against him until
five years after its entry, long past the maximum six
months allowed for setting aside a default judgment.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Furthermore,
appellant cannot win relief under the doctrine of
extrinsic fraud because mother's false assertion that
he was the boys' father is not the sort of falsehood
the doctrine encompasses. (See, e.g., Kachig v. Boothe
(1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 632-633, 99 Cal.Rptr. 393.)
In sum, a narrow, technical reading of the controlling
case law and statutes, with their emphasis on the
public interest in the finality of judgments, suggests
the trial court ruled correctly.
Sometimes even more important policies than the
finality of judgments are at stake, however. Mistakes
do happen, and a profound mistake occurred here when
appellant was charged with being the boys' father, an
error the County concedes. Instead of remedying its
mistake, the County retreats behind the procedural
redoubt offered by the passage of time since it took
appellant's default. [FN2]

FN2. We recognize that finality and certainty assume
greater importance when the issue is paternity in a
long-standing parent-child relationship, for then the
child's psychological well being is at stake. Here,
however, the issue is solely the cold-hard cash of
child support, as appellant has always denied
paternity and has no relationship with the boys. In
this dispute over money, the greater equities lie with
appellant, who has no relationship with the boys, than
with the County, whose obligation to the general
welfare compelled it to support the boys when their
real father did not.



It is this state's policy that when a mistake occurs
in a child support action, the County must correct it,
not exploit it. When the Legislature enacted the Child
Support Enforcement Fairness Act of 2000, it declared
"The efficient and fair enforcement of child support
orders is essential to ensuring compliance with those
orders and respect for the administration of
justice.... Thousands of individuals each year are
mistakenly identified as being liable for child
support actions. As a result of that action, the
ability to earn a living is severely impaired, assets
are seized, and family relationships are often
destroyed. It is the moral, legal, and ethical
obligation of all enforcement agencies to take prompt
action to recognize those cases where a person is
mistakenly identified as a support obligor in order to
minimize the harm and correct any injustice to that
person." (Stats.1999, ch. 653 (A.B.380), italics
added.)



The County, a political embodiment of its citizens and
inhabitants, must always act in the public interest
and for the general good. It should not enforce child
support judgments it knows to be unfounded. And in
particular, it should not ask the courts to assist it
in doing so. Despite the Legislature's clear directive
that child support agencies not pursue mistaken child
support actions, the County persists in asking that we
do so. We will not sully our *250 hands by
participating in an unjust, and factually unfounded,
result. We say no to the County, and we reverse.

DISPOSITION

The order denying appellant's motion to set aside the
default judgment is reversed. **908 Each side to bear
their own costs on appeal.

We concur: COOPER, P.J., and BOLAND, J.
Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2004.
County of Los Angeles v. Navarro
120 Cal.App.4th 246, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905, 4 Cal. Daily
Op. Serv. 5951, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8069


=====
Larry Hellmann, President
National Congress for Fathers and Children
550 West Vista Way, Suite 404
Vista, CA 92083
(760) 758-0268; Fax - 758-9557

AZ Astrea wrote:
I hope this is really as good as it sounds!
~AZ~

Posted from another group:


Recently in California, the Supreme Court has allowed
a decision to stand regarding the overturning of
paternity fraud. I have copies of the actual briefs
filed in the case ready for similar use in other
states and jurisdictions. The County of Los Angeles
moved to have the Supreme Court depublish the case in
order to deprive its use as precedent.

What is important is that the decision states that
although the statutory time for default set aside had
passed, the law required the default to be set aside
and that the County is obligated to act for the public
good.

This has been a long time coming and many individuals
and groups acted in concert and rose to the occasion
to prevent the depublication of the decision. Hooray
for working together to accomplish what any one of us
could not have done on our own.

For the edification of the reader, below is the actual
decision. There are two important decisions therein:
1) Man who was proved not to be father of two boys was
entitled to relief from default judgment establishing
his parental relationship and ordering him to pay
support, even though his motion for relief was
untimely, and any fraud on mother's part did not
entitle him to relief; family law required county to
correct child support mistakes, and man always denied
being father and never established relationship with
boys. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 473(b); and, 2) A
county, a political embodiment of its citizens and
inhabitants, must always act in the public interest
and for the general good.

Wow! Read that second one again!

Larry Hellmann, President National Congress for
Fathers and Children





120 Cal.App.4th 246, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905

Court of Appeal, Second District,

Division 8.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Manuel NAVARRO, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B155166.

June 30, 2004.


Background: After blood tests proved that man was not
father of two boys, man moved to set aside default
judgment establishing his parental relationship and
ordering him to pay support. The Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, No. BY119238, James B. Copelan,
Temporary Judge, denied man's motion. He appealed.

Holding: The Court of Appeal, Rubin, J., held that man
was entitled to relief from default.

Reversed.

**906 *247 Linda S. Ferrer for Defendant and
Appellant.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney; Phillip Browning,
Director, L. Cruz, Deputy Director, Nancy K. Ruffolo,
Attorney in Charge, and Fesia A. Davenport, Staff
Attorney, Child Support Services Department, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.


RUBIN, J.
Manuel Navarro appeals from the trial court's denial
of his motion to vacate a default judgment entered
against him in 1996. The judgment established his
parental relationship with two boys whom respondent
County of Los Angeles now concedes are not his sons,
and ordered him to pay child support. He seeks
reimbursement of child support, welfare
reimbursements, attorneys fees, and costs. We reverse.

*248 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 1996, the Bureau of Family Support Operations
in the District Attorney's Office [FN1] (the County)
filed a complaint to establish the paternity and child
support obligations of "Manuel Nava" for two boys born
in December 1995 who had been receiving public
assistance. The County attempted substitute service of
the complaint in May 1996 by leaving a copy at
appellant's address with "Jane Doe," listed as
"sister" and "co-tenant" and serving a copy by first
class mail. The complaint alerted appellant of the
danger of not answering the complaint if he denied
paternity, and warned he could become liable for child
support if the court determined he was the boys'
father. Appellant did not answer the complaint and the
County took his default in July 1996. The court
thereafter entered judgment establishing appellant's
paternity and ordered him to pay $247 in monthly child
support.

FN1. Pursuant to Family Code section 17304, on July 1,
2001, the County of Los Angeles Child Support Services
Department replaced the District Attorney's Bureau of
Family Support Operations as the County agency charged
with establishing parentage, obtaining and enforcing
orders for support.



Five years later in July 2001 appellant filed a motion
to set aside the judgment and have his answer deemed
filed because a recent genetic blood test indisputably
proved he was not the boys' father. He claimed that
although he lived at the address cited on the
complaint's proof of service, and he never attempted
to avoid service, he nonetheless never received a copy
of the summons and complaint or default judgment. In
support of his motion, he noted that blood tests in a
separate paternity action in San Bernardino County had
conclusively proven a few months earlier that he was
not the boys' father. Based on those tests, San
Bernardino County authorities had dismissed their
paternity suit against him with prejudice.
Acknowledging the six-month period for setting aside
the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473
had long passed, he argued relief was nevertheless
proper because the boys' mother had committed
extrinsic fraud in asserting he was the father when in
fact he was not, thus depriving him of a fair
adversarial hearing.
The County opposed the motion, arguing appellant had
not shown extrinsic fraud or mistake. According to the
County, the **907 mother's mere assertion that he was
the father was insufficient to establish extrinsic
fraud. Apparently agreeing with the County, the court
denied appellant's motion to set aside the judgment.
This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

By strict application of the law, appellant should be
denied relief. He did not file his motion to set aside
the County's default judgment *249 against him until
five years after its entry, long past the maximum six
months allowed for setting aside a default judgment.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Furthermore,
appellant cannot win relief under the doctrine of
extrinsic fraud because mother's false assertion that
he was the boys' father is not the sort of falsehood
the doctrine encompasses. (See, e.g., Kachig v. Boothe
(1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 632-633, 99 Cal.Rptr. 393.)
In sum, a narrow, technical reading of the controlling
case law and statutes, with their emphasis on the
public interest in the finality of judgments, suggests
the trial court ruled correctly.
Sometimes even more important policies than the
finality of judgments are at stake, however. Mistakes
do happen, and a profound mistake occurred here when
appellant was charged with being the boys' father, an
error the County concedes. Instead of remedying its
mistake, the County retreats behind the procedural
redoubt offered by the passage of time since it took
appellant's default. [FN2]

FN2. We recognize that finality and certainty assume
greater importance when the issue is paternity in a
long-standing parent-child relationship, for then the
child's psychological well being is at stake. Here,
however, the issue is solely the cold-hard cash of
child support, as appellant has always denied
paternity and has no relationship with the boys. In
this dispute over money, the greater equities lie with
appellant, who has no relationship with the boys, than
with the County, whose obligation to the general
welfare compelled it to support the boys when their
real father did not.



It is this state's policy that when a mistake occurs
in a child support action, the County must correct it,
not exploit it. When the Legislature enacted the Child
Support Enforcement Fairness Act of 2000, it declared
"The efficient and fair enforcement of child support
orders is essential to ensuring compliance with those
orders and respect for the administration of
justice.... Thousands of individuals each year are
mistakenly identified as being liable for child
support actions. As a result of that action, the
ability to earn a living is severely impaired, assets
are seized, and family relationships are often
destroyed. It is the moral, legal, and ethical
obligation of all enforcement agencies to take prompt
action to recognize those cases where a person is
mistakenly identified as a support obligor in order to
minimize the harm and correct any injustice to that
person." (Stats.1999, ch. 653 (A.B.380), italics
added.)



The County, a political embodiment of its citizens and
inhabitants, must always act in the public interest
and for the general good. It should not enforce child
support judgments it knows to be unfounded. And in
particular, it should not ask the courts to assist it
in doing so. Despite the Legislature's clear directive
that child support agencies not pursue mistaken child
support actions, the County persists in asking that we
do so. We will not sully our *250 hands by
participating in an unjust, and factually unfounded,
result. We say no to the County, and we reverse.

DISPOSITION

The order denying appellant's motion to set aside the
default judgment is reversed. **908 Each side to bear
their own costs on appeal.

We concur: COOPER, P.J., and BOLAND, J.
Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2004.
County of Los Angeles v. Navarro
120 Cal.App.4th 246, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905, 4 Cal. Daily
Op. Serv. 5951, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8069


=====
Larry Hellmann, President
National Congress for Fathers and Children
550 West Vista Way, Suite 404
Vista, CA 92083
(760) 758-0268; Fax - 758-9557





I don't see in your post any details about the actual decision refusing
the request to depublish Navarro. However, I did some searching and
there is a reference to the refusal on page 3 of this newsletter:

http://www.gbhlaw.com/gbhlawdaily_11_11_04.pdf

"Kenneth S." wrote in message
...
What has happened now in this case is that the California Supreme
Court
has refused to review a decision of the Court of Appeal, Second District,
thus protecting a man in a paternity fraud situation. But will he get his
money back? I very much doubt it.
------------------
I doubt if he gets his money back either.
-------------------

The Court of Appeal decision may have value as a precedent. So it MAY
be good news.

However, consider the following. There is a reference in the court
decision to the fact that "strict application of the law" would prevent
the
man from getting relief from the child support order because he waited
five
years before seeking it. In other words, California law ALLOWS the mother
to perpetrate paternity fraud in order to get money from this man, and
ALLOWS the County of Los Angeles to help her to do so. The judges simply
ignored the terms of the law, because the facts of this case were so
outrageous.

The judges' ruling in this case undoubtedly reflected natural justice.
However, I do not believe that in general judges should be allowed to
disregard the plain meaning and intention of the law. Their jobs should
not
be to decide what they think should be in the law. In one sense this
ruling
is only another illustration of the fact that judges are one of the
biggest
categories of scofflaws in the U.S.

The answer is to change the law -- not to rely on the hope that other
judges will follow this precedent, which appears to be based on nothing
other than the gut feelings of these judges.
-------------
That's what I thought as well. That the law could be on the books in such a
way as to srew any man in this situation. Let's hope the 'gut feeling' of
this judge will allow other judges to make similar rulings. But bottom
line, the law needs to be changed. I don't think even a man who has acted
as father and then learns he is not the bio dad should have to pay support.
The mother knew there was the possibility of other fathers yet didn't
disclose it is still fraudulent to me and in an ideal world she would have
to pay for her actions. In an ideal world.

~AZ~



"AZ Astrea" wrote in message
...
I hope this is really as good as it sounds!
~AZ~

Posted from another group:


Recently in California, the Supreme Court has allowed
a decision to stand regarding the overturning of
paternity fraud. I have copies of the actual briefs
filed in the case ready for similar use in other
states and jurisdictions. The County of Los Angeles
moved to have the Supreme Court depublish the case in
order to deprive its use as precedent.

What is important is that the decision states that
although the statutory time for default set aside had
passed, the law required the default to be set aside
and that the County is obligated to act for the public
good.

This has been a long time coming and many individuals
and groups acted in concert and rose to the occasion
to prevent the depublication of the decision. Hooray
for working together to accomplish what any one of us
could not have done on our own.

For the edification of the reader, below is the actual
decision. There are two important decisions therein:
1) Man who was proved not to be father of two boys was
entitled to relief from default judgment establishing
his parental relationship and ordering him to pay
support, even though his motion for relief was
untimely, and any fraud on mother's part did not
entitle him to relief; family law required county to
correct child support mistakes, and man always denied
being father and never established relationship with
boys. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 473(b); and, 2) A
county, a political embodiment of its citizens and
inhabitants, must always act in the public interest
and for the general good.

Wow! Read that second one again!

Larry Hellmann, President National Congress for
Fathers and Children





120 Cal.App.4th 246, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905

Court of Appeal, Second District,

Division 8.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Manuel NAVARRO, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B155166.

June 30, 2004.


Background: After blood tests proved that man was not
father of two boys, man moved to set aside default
judgment establishing his parental relationship and
ordering him to pay support. The Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, No. BY119238, James B. Copelan,
Temporary Judge, denied man's motion. He appealed.

Holding: The Court of Appeal, Rubin, J., held that man
was entitled to relief from default.

Reversed.

**906 *247 Linda S. Ferrer for Defendant and
Appellant.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney; Phillip Browning,
Director, L. Cruz, Deputy Director, Nancy K. Ruffolo,
Attorney in Charge, and Fesia A. Davenport, Staff
Attorney, Child Support Services Department, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.


RUBIN, J.
Manuel Navarro appeals from the trial court's denial
of his motion to vacate a default judgment entered
against him in 1996. The judgment established his
parental relationship with two boys whom respondent
County of Los Angeles now concedes are not his sons,
and ordered him to pay child support. He seeks
reimbursement of child support, welfare
reimbursements, attorneys fees, and costs. We reverse.

*248 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 1996, the Bureau of Family Support Operations
in the District Attorney's Office [FN1] (the County)
filed a complaint to establish the paternity and child
support obligations of "Manuel Nava" for two boys born
in December 1995 who had been receiving public
assistance. The County attempted substitute service of
the complaint in May 1996 by leaving a copy at
appellant's address with "Jane Doe," listed as
"sister" and "co-tenant" and serving a copy by first
class mail. The complaint alerted appellant of the
danger of not answering the complaint if he denied
paternity, and warned he could become liable for child
support if the court determined he was the boys'
father. Appellant did not answer the complaint and the
County took his default in July 1996. The court
thereafter entered judgment establishing appellant's
paternity and ordered him to pay $247 in monthly child
support.

FN1. Pursuant to Family Code section 17304, on July 1,
2001, the County of Los Angeles Child Support Services
Department replaced the District Attorney's Bureau of
Family Support Operations as the County agency charged
with establishing parentage, obtaining and enforcing
orders for support.



Five years later in July 2001 appellant filed a motion
to set aside the judgment and have his answer deemed
filed because a recent genetic blood test indisputably
proved he was not the boys' father. He claimed that
although he lived at the address cited on the
complaint's proof of service, and he never attempted
to avoid service, he nonetheless never received a copy
of the summons and complaint or default judgment. In
support of his motion, he noted that blood tests in a
separate paternity action in San Bernardino County had
conclusively proven a few months earlier that he was
not the boys' father. Based on those tests, San
Bernardino County authorities had dismissed their
paternity suit against him with prejudice.
Acknowledging the six-month period for setting aside
the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473
had long passed, he argued relief was nevertheless
proper because the boys' mother had committed
extrinsic fraud in asserting he was the father when in
fact he was not, thus depriving him of a fair
adversarial hearing.
The County opposed the motion, arguing appellant had
not shown extrinsic fraud or mistake. According to the
County, the **907 mother's mere assertion that he was
the father was insufficient to establish extrinsic
fraud. Apparently agreeing with the County, the court
denied appellant's motion to set aside the judgment.
This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

By strict application of the law, appellant should be
denied relief. He did not file his motion to set aside
the County's default judgment *249 against him until
five years after its entry, long past the maximum six
months allowed for setting aside a default judgment.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Furthermore,
appellant cannot win relief under the doctrine of
extrinsic fraud because mother's false assertion that
he was the boys' father is not the sort of falsehood
the doctrine encompasses. (See, e.g., Kachig v. Boothe
(1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 632-633, 99 Cal.Rptr. 393.)
In sum, a narrow, technical reading of the controlling
case law and statutes, with their emphasis on the
public interest in the finality of judgments, suggests
the trial court ruled correctly.
Sometimes even more important policies than the
finality of judgments are at stake, however. Mistakes
do happen, and a profound mistake occurred here when
appellant was charged with being the boys' father, an
error the County concedes. Instead of remedying its
mistake, the County retreats behind the procedural
redoubt offered by the passage of time since it took
appellant's default. [FN2]

FN2. We recognize that finality and certainty assume
greater importance when the issue is paternity in a
long-standing parent-child relationship, for then the
child's psychological well being is at stake. Here,
however, the issue is solely the cold-hard cash of
child support, as appellant has always denied
paternity and has no relationship with the boys. In
this dispute over money, the greater equities lie with
appellant, who has no relationship with the boys, than
with the County, whose obligation to the general
welfare compelled it to support the boys when their
real father did not.



It is this state's policy that when a mistake occurs
in a child support action, the County must correct it,
not exploit it. When the Legislature enacted the Child
Support Enforcement Fairness Act of 2000, it declared
"The efficient and fair enforcement of child support
orders is essential to ensuring compliance with those
orders and respect for the administration of
justice.... Thousands of individuals each year are
mistakenly identified as being liable for child
support actions. As a result of that action, the
ability to earn a living is severely impaired, assets
are seized, and family relationships are often
destroyed. It is the moral, legal, and ethical
obligation of all enforcement agencies to take prompt
action to recognize those cases where a person is
mistakenly identified as a support obligor in order to
minimize the harm and correct any injustice to that
person." (Stats.1999, ch. 653 (A.B.380), italics
added.)



The County, a political embodiment of its citizens and
inhabitants, must always act in the public interest
and for the general good. It should not enforce child
support judgments it knows to be unfounded. And in
particular, it should not ask the courts to assist it
in doing so. Despite the Legislature's clear directive
that child support agencies not pursue mistaken child
support actions, the County persists in asking that we
do so. We will not sully our *250 hands by
participating in an unjust, and factually unfounded,
result. We say no to the County, and we reverse.

DISPOSITION

The order denying appellant's motion to set aside the
default judgment is reversed. **908 Each side to bear
their own costs on appeal.

We concur: COOPER, P.J., and BOLAND, J.
Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2004.
County of Los Angeles v. Navarro
120 Cal.App.4th 246, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905, 4 Cal. Daily
Op. Serv. 5951, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8069


=====
Larry Hellmann, President
National Congress for Fathers and Children
550 West Vista Way, Suite 404
Vista, CA 92083
(760) 758-0268; Fax - 758-9557

"JayR" wrote in message
...
AZ Astrea wrote:
I hope this is really as good as it sounds!
~AZ~

Posted from another group:


Recently in California, the Supreme Court has allowed
a decision to stand regarding the overturning of
paternity fraud. I have copies of the actual briefs
filed in the case ready for similar use in other
states and jurisdictions. The County of Los Angeles
moved to have the Supreme Court depublish the case in
order to deprive its use as precedent.

What is important is that the decision states that
although the statutory time for default set aside had
passed, the law required the default to be set aside
and that the County is obligated to act for the public
good.

This has been a long time coming and many individuals
and groups acted in concert and rose to the occasion
to prevent the depublication of the decision. Hooray
for working together to accomplish what any one of us
could not have done on our own.

For the edification of the reader, below is the actual
decision. There are two important decisions therein:
1) Man who was proved not to be father of two boys was
entitled to relief from default judgment establishing
his parental relationship and ordering him to pay
support, even though his motion for relief was
untimely, and any fraud on mother's part did not
entitle him to relief; family law required county to
correct child support mistakes, and man always denied
being father and never established relationship with
boys. West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 473(b); and, 2) A
county, a political embodiment of its citizens and
inhabitants, must always act in the public interest
and for the general good.

Wow! Read that second one again!

Larry Hellmann, President National Congress for
Fathers and Children





120 Cal.App.4th 246, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905

Court of Appeal, Second District,

Division 8.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Manuel NAVARRO, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B155166.

June 30, 2004.


Background: After blood tests proved that man was not
father of two boys, man moved to set aside default
judgment establishing his parental relationship and
ordering him to pay support. The Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, No. BY119238, James B. Copelan,
Temporary Judge, denied man's motion. He appealed.

Holding: The Court of Appeal, Rubin, J., held that man
was entitled to relief from default.

Reversed.

**906 *247 Linda S. Ferrer for Defendant and
Appellant.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney; Phillip Browning,
Director, L. Cruz, Deputy Director, Nancy K. Ruffolo,
Attorney in Charge, and Fesia A. Davenport, Staff
Attorney, Child Support Services Department, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.


RUBIN, J.
Manuel Navarro appeals from the trial court's denial
of his motion to vacate a default judgment entered
against him in 1996. The judgment established his
parental relationship with two boys whom respondent
County of Los Angeles now concedes are not his sons,
and ordered him to pay child support. He seeks
reimbursement of child support, welfare
reimbursements, attorneys fees, and costs. We reverse.

*248 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 1996, the Bureau of Family Support Operations
in the District Attorney's Office [FN1] (the County)
filed a complaint to establish the paternity and child
support obligations of "Manuel Nava" for two boys born
in December 1995 who had been receiving public
assistance. The County attempted substitute service of
the complaint in May 1996 by leaving a copy at
appellant's address with "Jane Doe," listed as
"sister" and "co-tenant" and serving a copy by first
class mail. The complaint alerted appellant of the
danger of not answering the complaint if he denied
paternity, and warned he could become liable for child
support if the court determined he was the boys'
father. Appellant did not answer the complaint and the
County took his default in July 1996. The court
thereafter entered judgment establishing appellant's
paternity and ordered him to pay $247 in monthly child
support.

FN1. Pursuant to Family Code section 17304, on July 1,
2001, the County of Los Angeles Child Support Services
Department replaced the District Attorney's Bureau of
Family Support Operations as the County agency charged
with establishing parentage, obtaining and enforcing
orders for support.



Five years later in July 2001 appellant filed a motion
to set aside the judgment and have his answer deemed
filed because a recent genetic blood test indisputably
proved he was not the boys' father. He claimed that
although he lived at the address cited on the
complaint's proof of service, and he never attempted
to avoid service, he nonetheless never received a copy
of the summons and complaint or default judgment. In
support of his motion, he noted that blood tests in a
separate paternity action in San Bernardino County had
conclusively proven a few months earlier that he was
not the boys' father. Based on those tests, San
Bernardino County authorities had dismissed their
paternity suit against him with prejudice.
Acknowledging the six-month period for setting aside
the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473
had long passed, he argued relief was nevertheless
proper because the boys' mother had committed
extrinsic fraud in asserting he was the father when in
fact he was not, thus depriving him of a fair
adversarial hearing.
The County opposed the motion, arguing appellant had
not shown extrinsic fraud or mistake. According to the
County, the **907 mother's mere assertion that he was
the father was insufficient to establish extrinsic
fraud. Apparently agreeing with the County, the court
denied appellant's motion to set aside the judgment.
This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

By strict application of the law, appellant should be
denied relief. He did not file his motion to set aside
the County's default judgment *249 against him until
five years after its entry, long past the maximum six
months allowed for setting aside a default judgment.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b).) Furthermore,
appellant cannot win relief under the doctrine of
extrinsic fraud because mother's false assertion that
he was the boys' father is not the sort of falsehood
the doctrine encompasses. (See, e.g., Kachig v. Boothe
(1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 632-633, 99 Cal.Rptr. 393.)
In sum, a narrow, technical reading of the controlling
case law and statutes, with their emphasis on the
public interest in the finality of judgments, suggests
the trial court ruled correctly.
Sometimes even more important policies than the
finality of judgments are at stake, however. Mistakes
do happen, and a profound mistake occurred here when
appellant was charged with being the boys' father, an
error the County concedes. Instead of remedying its
mistake, the County retreats behind the procedural
redoubt offered by the passage of time since it took
appellant's default. [FN2]

FN2. We recognize that finality and certainty assume
greater importance when the issue is paternity in a
long-standing parent-child relationship, for then the
child's psychological well being is at stake. Here,
however, the issue is solely the cold-hard cash of
child support, as appellant has always denied
paternity and has no relationship with the boys. In
this dispute over money, the greater equities lie with
appellant, who has no relationship with the boys, than
with the County, whose obligation to the general
welfare compelled it to support the boys when their
real father did not.



It is this state's policy that when a mistake occurs
in a child support action, the County must correct it,
not exploit it. When the Legislature enacted the Child
Support Enforcement Fairness Act of 2000, it declared
"The efficient and fair enforcement of child support
orders is essential to ensuring compliance with those
orders and respect for the administration of
justice.... Thousands of individuals each year are
mistakenly identified as being liable for child
support actions. As a result of that action, the
ability to earn a living is severely impaired, assets
are seized, and family relationships are often
destroyed. It is the moral, legal, and ethical
obligation of all enforcement agencies to take prompt
action to recognize those cases where a person is
mistakenly identified as a support obligor in order to
minimize the harm and correct any injustice to that
person." (Stats.1999, ch. 653 (A.B.380), italics
added.)



The County, a political embodiment of its citizens and
inhabitants, must always act in the public interest
and for the general good. It should not enforce child
support judgments it knows to be unfounded. And in
particular, it should not ask the courts to assist it
in doing so. Despite the Legislature's clear directive
that child support agencies not pursue mistaken child
support actions, the County persists in asking that we
do so. We will not sully our *250 hands by
participating in an unjust, and factually unfounded,
result. We say no to the County, and we reverse.

DISPOSITION

The order denying appellant's motion to set aside the
default judgment is reversed. **908 Each side to bear
their own costs on appeal.

We concur: COOPER, P.J., and BOLAND, J.
Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2004.
County of Los Angeles v. Navarro
120 Cal.App.4th 246, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905, 4 Cal. Daily
Op. Serv. 5951, 2004 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8069


=====
Larry Hellmann, President
National Congress for Fathers and Children
550 West Vista Way, Suite 404
Vista, CA 92083
(760) 758-0268; Fax - 758-9557





I don't see in your post any details about the actual decision refusing
the request to depublish Navarro. However, I did some searching and
there is a reference to the refusal on page 3 of this newsletter:

http://www.gbhlaw.com/gbhlawdaily_11_11_04.pdf
--------------------
So they did refuse the request to depublish it. And it can be cited in
other cases.

Yippee!

~AZ~

AZ Astrea wrote:
"JayR" wrote in message
...

AZ Astrea wrote:

I don't see in your post any details about the actual decision refusing
the request to depublish Navarro. However, I did some searching and
there is a reference to the refusal on page 3 of this newsletter:

http://www.gbhlaw.com/gbhlawdaily_11_11_04.pdf

--------------------
So they did refuse the request to depublish it. And it can be cited in
other cases.

Yippee!

I still don't see it from looking at the given website. Can you point
out what I am missing?

I am putting together a packet of information for my honors class to
look at concerning the justification of "men's rights groups", since
they came up in discussion today about women's rights and the
abolitionist movement right before the civil war in US History.

Thanks!

- Ron ^*^

I can't copy and paste because I don't have Adobe or whatever but it's on
the top of the 3rd page, the last two paragraphs before Top Stories From
Today's LA Daily Journal Online.

Hope this helps.
~AZ~

"Werebat" wrote in message
news:AF9nd.45$T02.2@lakeread06...


AZ Astrea wrote:
"JayR" wrote in message
...

AZ Astrea wrote:

I don't see in your post any details about the actual decision refusing
the request to depublish Navarro. However, I did some searching and
there is a reference to the refusal on page 3 of this newsletter:

http://www.gbhlaw.com/gbhlawdaily_11_11_04.pdf

--------------------
So they did refuse the request to depublish it. And it can be cited in
other cases.

Yippee!

I still don't see it from looking at the given website. Can you point
out what I am missing?

I am putting together a packet of information for my honors class to
look at concerning the justification of "men's rights groups", since
they came up in discussion today about women's rights and the
abolitionist movement right before the civil war in US History.

Thanks!

- Ron ^*^